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Abstract 
 
Does it matter for domestic investment whether a country’s financial system is bank 
based or stock-market based?  This paper posits that financial intermediation affects 
domestic investment notably by alleviating financing constraints, allowing firms to 
increase investment in response to increased demand for output.  The key result is that the 
structure of the financial system has no independent effect on investment, in the sense 
that it does not enhance the response of investment to changes in output, while financial 
development makes investment more responsive to output growth.  Consequently, rather 
than promoting a particular type of financial structure, countries should implement 
policies that reduce transactions costs in financial intermediation and enforce creditor and 
investor rights.  This will facilitate the development of banks and stock markets, which 
will stimulate domestic investment. 
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1. Introduction 
For over a century, economists have debated the comparative merits of bank-
based systems and stock-market-based systems in mobilizing resources and enhancing 
economic growth (see Levine 2001 for a review of this debate).1  This paper examines 
whether bank-based or stock-market-based financial systems are better at promoting 
domestic investment.  To investigate this empirical question, the paper posits that 
financial intermediation affects investment notably by alleviating financing constraints, 
and that better functioning financial systems allow firms to invest more in response to 
increased demand for output.  It follows that at the aggregate level, developed financial 
systems are associated with a stronger response of domestic investment to an increase in 
per capita GDP.  This analysis draws from the accelerator theory, which predicts a 
positive relationship between investment and changes in output.2   
The econometric analysis in this paper is based on a sample of 99 countries 
including developed and developing countries for the period 1965-1997.  The effect of 
financial structure is examined by classifying countries into four categories: financially 
developed bank based, financially developed stock market based, financially 
underdeveloped bank based, and financially underdeveloped stock market based systems 
(see Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine’s 2001).  The analysis uses a dynamic investment 
equation including lagged investment, an indicator of financial intermediation, an 
interaction term between the lag of the growth rate of per capita GDP and a dummy for 
the financial structure category, and other determinants of investment.  A significant 
                                                 
1 Also see Stulz (2001) for a discussion of the links between financial structure and corporate financing. 
2 See Jorgenson (1971) for a survey of the accelerator investment model and other conventional investment 
theories. 
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coefficient on the interaction term implies that financial structure affects domestic 
investment through the accelerator effect. 
 
The paper tests whether financial structure has an independent effect on domestic 
investment by controlling for the level of financial development using conventional 
measures of financial intermediation.  The effect of financial development on domestic 
investment are tested using both cross-section and panel data regressions.  To circumvent 
potential simultaneity problems arising from possible two-way relationships between 
financial intermediation and investment, lags of the financial intermediation indicators 
are used as instruments in the panel data regressions.  In the cross-section regression 
analysis the initial level of financial development and the country’s legal origin are used 
alternatively as instruments for financial development.  The objective is to establish a 
connection between the exogenous component of financial development and domestic 
investment and test whether financial structure exerts any incremental effect on domestic 
investment given the level of financial development.   
 
The key finding in this paper is that the structure of the financial system has no 
independent effect on investment, in the sense that it does not enhance the response of 
domestic investment to changes in per capita GDP in a model that accounts for the level 
of financial development and other determinants of investment.  In contrast, the overall 
level of financial development makes domestic investment more responsive to output 
growth (accelerator-enhancing effect).  The evidence in this paper suggests that it is the 
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level of financial development, not the type of financial system that matters for domestic 
investment.   
 
This paper is an important contribution to the existing body of empirical research 
on the links between financial intermediation and economic activity.  Specifically it sheds 
some light on the debate on the role of financial structure and complements recent studies 
that have concluded that financial structure has no effect on long-run economic growth 
(Levine 2001).  This paper focuses on an important aspect of economic activity, namely 
domestic investment, which plays a substantial role in long-run economic growth.  Unlike 
conventional country case studies which have been used to explore the effects of 
financial structure on economic performance, this paper exploits cross-country variations 
in both financial structure and domestic investment.   
 
 The remainder of the text is organized as follows.  The next section reviews the 
literature on the role and comparative merits of banks and stock markets in facilitating 
domestic investment.  Section 3 describes the data and presents some summary statistics.  
Section 4 presents the methodology and discusses the econometric results and section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Financial Development vs. Financial Structure 
2.1 Overview 
 
There are two related but different questions with regard to the impact of financial 
intermediation on real economic activity.  The first question is whether financial 
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development affects real economic activity.  The second is whether the structure of the 
financial system matters for real economic outcomes.  Empirical research has explored 
the first question quite extensively.  Following the influential work by King and Levine 
(1993a, 1993b), several empirical studies have provided evidence that strongly supports 
the view that financial development has a positive effect on various aspects of real 
economic activity, including investment (Ndikumana 2000; Rajan and Zingales 1998; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1996), employment, productivity, and long run 
economic growth (Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000; Beck, Levine, Loayza 2000; Levine 
and Zervos 1998; Levine 1997).  The evidence suggests that the expansion and deepening 
of the financial system lead to faster economic growth.  Without completely settling the 
issue of direction of causality,3 this empirical literature has made significant advances in 
establishing that the exogenous component of financial development has a positive effect 
on economic growth.  The results support the view that financial development leads 
economic growth. 
 
Until recently, there was relatively less empirical research on the impact of 
financial structure on economic activity.  Historically, the debate over the role of the 
structure of the financial system for economic activity has revolved around case studies 
on the comparative merits and disadvantages of banks vs. stock markets in stimulating 
economic growth.4  The research traditionally focused on the comparison between 
                                                 
3 Since Goldsmith (1958, 1969) and Patrick (1966) raised the issue of direction of causality between 
finance and economic growth, arguments have been made in support of both the schumpeterian view of 
finance as an engine of growth (Schumpeter 1934) and the Robinsonian view of finance as a passive 
follower of economic growth (Robinson 1952). 
4 See Levine (2001) and Stulz (2001) for a review of this debate, a discussion of its relevance for empirical 
analysis and policy, and further references on this topic. 
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countries that have predominantly bank-based financial systems (Germany and Japan) to 
those that have stock-market-based systems (the United States and England).  Studies on 
Germany and Japan have examined the role of banks’ involvement in the ownership and 
management of corporations and specific roles of bank-firm relationships in the supply of 
credit, the efficiency of resource allocation, productivity, and overall economic 
performance.  Studies on the United States and England have emphasized such special 
functions of stock markets as collecting information and facilitating takeovers, and their 
impact on economic performance.  It is difficult to draw general conclusions on the 
comparative merits of banks vs. stock markets from these case studies, especially given 
that the four countries most studied (England, Germany, Japan, and the United States) 
have had similar long-run economic performance. 
 
Recent research has concluded that both banks and stock markets are important 
for economic performance and that they are complementary.  This new research suggests 
that it is not analytically useful to think in terms of banks vs. stock markets (Levine 
2001).  Levine (2001) identifies two new approaches in this literature: the financial 
services view and the law and finance view.  The financial services view stresses the role 
of the financial system in alleviating market imperfections and providing key services to 
the private sector, thus enhancing economic performance (Merton 1995; Levine 1997).  
Financial systems improve economic performance by assessing investment opportunities 
and exerting corporate control, easing risk management, and lowering the costs of 
resource mobilization (Levine 1997).  As financial systems develop, they become more 
efficient in providing these services, which enhances economic performance.  According 
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to the financial services view, whether the financial system is predominantly bank based 
or stock-market based is largely irrelevant for economic outcomes. 
 
The law and finance view, initiated by Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1998, 1997), emphasizes the role of creditor and investor rights for financial 
intermediation.  In countries where the legal system enforces these rights effectively, the 
financial system also becomes more efficient in providing services to the private sector.  
Consequently, the quality of the legal system is a strong predictor of financial 
development.  Empirically, this view suggests a positive relationship between economic 
performance and the component of financial development identified by the legal 
environment.  Evidence from cross-country growth analysis supports this view (Levine 
1999, 1998; Laporta et al. 1998, 1997).  The implication of the law and finance view is 
that the establishment of an appropriate legal environment will facilitate the development 
of banks and stock markets, which enhances economic performance.  The remainder of 
this section discusses the role of banks and stock markets in promoting domestic 
investment. 
 
2.2 Banks and investment 
 Banks can enhance domestic investment in various ways.  First, banks increase 
the amount of funds available for investment by pooling savings.  Financial 
intermediaries are able to economize on the costs of collecting savings from 
heterogeneous saving units by exploiting economies of scale in information gathering and 
processing.  As a result, for given levels of per capita income and potential saving rate, 
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the actual saving and investment rates should be higher in countries that have more 
developed banking systems (see Pagano 1993). 
 
 Second, banks enhance investment by reducing liquidity risk (Diamond and 
Dybvig 1983; Bencivenga and Smith 1991).  Investment often requires the commitment 
of large amounts of capital for a long time.  However, individual savers are reluctant to 
lend over the long term because they need to maintain a comfortable degree of liquidity 
in their asset portfolios.  Banks can facilitate this trade-off between returns to assets and 
liquidity by pooling savings, borrowing short term and lending long term.  In a country 
with a poorly developed banking system, profitable investment projects will not be 
undertaken because of the lack of capital.  The development of banks should be 
accompanied by better allocation of resources and a healthier balance between short-term 
and long-term investment in the private sector. 
 
 Third, financial intermediaries play an important role in reducing the costs of 
acquiring and processing information about prospective investment activities and in 
exerting control over the management of existing firms (Diamond 1984).  Large firms 
obtain funds from a diffuse pool of external investors who individually cannot monitor 
the use of their funds inside the firm.  Banks play the role of “delegated monitors” of the 
behavior of firm managers on the behalf of individual investors.  The ability of banks to 
perform this monitoring function provides more incentives to outside investors to part 
with their savings and improves the allocation of funds across projects.  A developed 
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banking system, therefore, should induce higher volumes of investment and more 
efficient allocation of capital. 
 
Banks specialize in offering customized financial products that are tailored to the 
needs of individual firms.  They are especially the primary source for external finance for 
investors (borrowers) who have little access to financial markets, such as new and small 
firms.  As Merton (1995: 26) points out, “financial markets tend to be efficient 
institutional alternatives to intermediaries when the products have standardized terms, 
can serve a large number of customers, and are well-enough ‘understood’ for transactors 
to be comfortable in assessing their prices.  As we also know, intermediaries are better 
suited for low-volume products.”  Banks are especially important for financing the 
operation of small firms and the creation of new firms.  Evidence shows that small firms 
in industrialized countries tend to rely more heavily on bank finance than larger firms 
(Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988).  Moreover, studies from industrialized countries 
show that shocks to credit supply by banks (e.g., from monetary policy innovations) have 
a disproportionately large impact on investment for bank-dependent firms, especially 
small firms (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994).  As a result, we expect a close connection 
between bank lending and aggregate investment. 
 
 Due to their special role of offering customized products, banks are important in 
financial innovation, that is, the creation of new financial products.  Eventually, some of 
these new products are transferred to financial markets through the “financial innovation 
spiral” by which banks and financial markets are complementary institutions (Merton 
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1995).  Banks therefore are important in the Schumpeterian destructive creation process 
of innovation both in the real sector – by financing innovating entrepreneurs – and in the 
financial sector – by creating new financial instruments.   
 
 Critiques of bank-based systems point to a number of drawbacks and weaknesses 
of such systems in their ability to enhance investment and economic performance.  First, 
banks may be tempted to extract rent from the information collected on prospective 
investment projects, thus reducing the payoff that accrues to firms.  This may reduce the 
efforts by firms to undertake innovative activities (Rajan 1992).  Second, banks may have 
a “bias toward prudence.”  Indeed, evidence from Japan shows that firms with close ties 
to a “main bank” tend to use innovative technologies less and also have lower profit rates 
than those without close ties to a “main bank,” suggesting that banks extract rent from 
their relationships with firms (Weinstein and Yafeh 1998; Morck and Nakamura 1999).  
Third, critiques of bank-based systems argue that close bank-firm relationships may 
preclude competition in credit markets and reduce banks’ ability to enforce efficiency in 
corporate governance.  Morck and Nakamura (1999) present evidence suggesting that 
banks tend to “prop up” weak firms that belong to bank groups while they promote the 
interests of creditors when dealing with firms outside of bank groups.  Moreover, some 
studies have shown that while close bank-firm relationships may facilitate access to 
capital, they do not necessarily reduce the cost of capital nor do they increase investment 
for firms with close ties to bank groups (Weinstein and Yafeh 1998).5 
                                                 
5 A number of studies find that firms with main bank relationships tend to incur higher interest payments.  
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998: 659) interpret the interest rate differential as a price for liquidity services 
(higher access to capital) and an “implicit insurance premium” (insurance against bankruptcy) offered by 
banks to client firms. 
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2.3 Stock markets and investment 
 The literature contains substantial evidence on a positive correlation between 
stock market activity and investment.6  Barro (1990) concluded that, even after 
controlling for indicators of future profitability (fundamentals), such as current and past 
profits, stock market variables have a significant predictive power for investment.  The 
apparent correlation between stock market indicators and aggregate investment raises the 
important question of how exactly the stock market affects investment. 
 
 Researchers have suggested various potential connections between stock market 
activity and investment.  The stock market supplies information about the profitability of 
investment.  As a result, a well-functioning stock market may induce a high level of 
investment because it can identify fundable projects that otherwise may not be 
undertaken.  The stock market also affects the quality of investment or the allocation of 
capital by channeling funds to the most profitable investment activities.   
 
 Second, the stock market may affect investment through its effects on the cost of 
capital.  As the stock market expands and becomes more liquid, the opportunities for risk 
sharing expand, which lowers the cost of equity finance.  This prediction is supported by 
evidence that shows that stock market liberalization is accompanied by an increase in 
aggregate stock market valuation and a decrease in the cost of equity capital (Henry 
2000a) and an increase in investment (Henry 2000b).   
 
                                                 
6 See Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) for a survey. 
  11 
 Third, the stock market affects investment by exerting pressure on corporate 
management (Stiglitz 1985), especially through effective takeover or threat of takeover 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976).  As a result, a well-functioning stock market enhances 
profitability through the process of survival of the fittest in the corporate sector.  Stock 
markets also affect corporate governance by making it easier to tie managerial 
compensation to firm’s performance. 
 
 Critiques of stock-market-based systems point to a number of factors that may 
limit the ability of stock markets to increase the volume and quality of investment.  First, 
the prediction that stock market valuation is a useful guide for investment decisions relies 
on the assumption that the market valuation of firm’s profitability is better than that of 
the manager of the firm.  In the presence of market frictions, such as information 
asymmetries, or due to speculative behavior, the market valuation of firm’s profitability 
may substantially differ from that of the manager.  In this case, which valuation should 
drive investment decisions?  There are diverging views on this question.  On one side, 
some suggest that investment decisions should be based primarily on market valuation 
(Fischer and Merton 1984).  The argument is that to the extent that outside investors are 
willing to accept a lower rate of return, managers should increase investment up to the 
point where the rate of return equals the marginal product of capital.  On the other side, 
there are those who argue that the investment decision should be guided by the manager’s 
own valuation of firm’s profitability (Bosworth 1975).  Under this view, the stock market 
is simply a “side show” and it does not supply any new useful information that can help 
mangers in making investment decisions.  In this case, so the argument goes, positive 
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correlations between investment and stock returns only reflect the econometrician’s 
inability to fully account for economic fundamentals (Morck, Shleifter, and Vishny 
1990).  Under this view, it is argued that the manager’s information set is larger than that 
of the econometrician, and this could be the only reason why stock returns are correlated 
with investment.  Empirical studies have provided evidence that suggests that the role of 
the stock market for investment at the firm level is rather limited (see Blanchard, Rhee, 
and Summers 1993).   
 
Second, while stock markets can facilitate the collect of information on 
investment opportunities, they also make this information accessible to all market 
participants.  This creates a free-rider problem, which may discourage investors from 
expending resources to collect information (Stiglitz 1985).  In principle, the free-rider 
problem should be less prominent in bank-based systems since banks reveal less 
information publicly about individual firms and projects.   
 
Third, while stock markets may facilitate takeovers, critiques argue that this does 
not necessarily result in higher efficiency.  Stock markets do not fully eliminate 
information asymmetries and insiders may have more information than outsiders (Myers 
and Majluf 1984).  It is therefore difficult for outsiders to outbid insiders.  Singh (1975) 
suggests that takeovers are an imperfect mechanism for economic “natural selection.”  
Using evidence from the United Kingdom, Singh (1997) points out that large firms are 
able to survive not by improving profitability but by increasing their relative size even 
further through takeovers. 
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Moreover, takeovers do not necessarily result in a net increase in the quantity of 
investment; they may simply amount to a transfer of wealth from the old residual 
claimants to the new owners.  Evidence from the United States shows that the massive 
takeover activity that occurred in the 1980s generated neither much net investment nor 
significant gains in efficiency, but instead left the corporate sector highly leveraged 
(Crotty and Goldstein 1993).   
 
In the same line of argument, Shleifer and Summers (1988) point out that stock 
markets may facilitate hostile takeovers that create value for the new owners only by 
redistributing wealth at the disadvantage of (by extracting rent from) existing 
stakeholders such as workers and suppliers.  These authors argue that hostile takeovers 
involve a breach of implicit contracts at the detriment of existing stakeholders.  
Consequently, takeovers have both value-creating and value-redistributing effects and 
“the latter are likely to be of dominant importance” (Shleifer and Summers 1988: 34).  
Singh and Weiss (1998) argue that the mechanism of takeovers leads managers to 
emphasize short-term outcomes at the disadvantage of long-term investment, with 
negative consequences on macroeconomic performance.   
 
To summarize, the literature has offered an extensive debate on the comparative 
advantages of banks vs. stock markets for investment.  Proponents of bank-based systems 
emphasize the ability of banks to overcome market frictions, promote long-term 
investment, and enhance efficiency in the allocation of capital.  Proponents of stock 
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markets stress the role of stock markets in reducing liquidity risk and exerting corporate 
control, especially through takeovers.  However, history contains no evidence of 
countries with either well-developed banking systems or large and active stock markets 
that did not experience high levels of domestic investment and economic growth.7  As 
Levine (2001) suggests, it may be better to think not in terms of banks vs. stock markets 
but in terms of banks and stock markets.  The analysis in this paper sheds some light on 
this issue. 
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 This study uses a sample of 99 countries including developing and developed 
countries for the period 1965-1997.  The data are from World Development Indicators; 
International Financial Statistics; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001); Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine 2000; and Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001).  Table A1 in the appendix 
contains a description of the sample.  Details on variable definitions and data sources are 
provided in Table A2 in the appendix.   
 
Because it is difficult to find a comprehensive index of financial intermediation, this 
study uses various aggregate indicators that have been used in the literature: liquid 
liabilities, credit to the private sector, net domestic credit, and bank credit, each as 
percentage of GDP; and the ratio of banks’ assets as a percentage of the sum of banks’ 
assets plus the assets of the central bank.  Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), Levine 
                                                 
7 Commenting on an earlier draft of this paper at a workshop at the Political Economy Research Institute at 
the University of Massachusetts in October 2000, Professor James Crotty pointed out that financial 
deepening has historically been associated with increased economic performance, and that financial depth 
without economic growth is a “historic impossibility.”   
  15 
(1997), and Lynch (1996) discuss issues related to the measurement of financial 
development. 
 
Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), countries are classified into two 
categories of financial development: financially developed and financially 
underdeveloped.  A country is classified as financially developed if both its banking 
sector development (measured by bank credit) and its stock market development 
(measured by total value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP) are above the sample 
averages.  To increase the number of countries classified by financial development, the 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine sample is expanded using information from World 
Development Indicators.  This allows us to classify 94 countries as financially developed 
or financially underdeveloped.  Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), countries 
are further classified into four sub-categories of financial structure: financially developed 
bank-based, financially developed stock-market-based, financially underdeveloped bank-
based, and financially underdeveloped stock-market-based.  The developed bank-based 
and the underdeveloped bank-based form the broad category of bank-based systems, 
while the developed stock-market based and the underdeveloped stock-market based 
form the broad category of stock-market based systems.  This classification is used to 
investigate the effects of financial structure on investment. 
 
Table 1 contains some summary statistics for domestic investment and financial 
indicators.  In examining the relationships between financial development and 
investment, it is important to consider both cross-country variations and within-country 
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time series variations to fully capture the dynamics of the interactions.  Such an analysis 
is possible with panel data, which contain both the cross-sectional and time series 
dimensions.  As the statistics in Table 1 show, there are large variations across countries 
in both investment and financial development (also see Table A3 in the appendix for 
individual country means) of regression variables.  The standard deviation is 8% for 
domestic investment (with a mean of 22%) and 29% for liquid liabilities (with a mean of 
42%).  The within-country variation adds another 5% standard deviation for domestic 
investment and 10% for liquid liabilities.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the means of the regression variables by financial development 
and by financial structure category.  There are remarkable differences between the 
financially developed and the financially underdeveloped categories.  The financially 
developed category has higher level and growth rate of income, higher investment, and 
obviously larger financial development ratios than the financially underdeveloped 
category.  The differences are much less evident across financial structure categories.  
After controlling for the level of financial development, there are no systematic 
differences between the two types of financial systems (columns 5-8).  Overall, the 
structure of the financial system does not seem to be a significant distinguishing feature 
for the level and growth rate of income and investment.  This finding is confirmed by the 
regression results discussed in section 4 below.  The data show a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between domestic investment and all the indicators of financial 
development, as reported in Table 3.   
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
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4. Econometric Analysis: Specification and Results 
4.1. Testing for the effects of financial development on investment 
a. Panel data regressions 
 The first part of the econometric analysis examines whether the exogenous 
component of financial development has an impact on domestic investment.  The analysis 
is based on a dynamic investment equation that includes an indicator of financial 
development along with a set of control variables.  The dynamic feature of the model 
arises from the inclusion of lagged investment as a dependent variable.  Except for the 
growth rate of real per capita GDP, the regression variables are in logarithm, which 
accounts for potential nonlinearities between domestic investment and the explanatory 
factors.  Because of this logarithmic formulation we can interpret the estimated 
coefficients directly as elasticities. 
 
 To circumvent potential simultaneity problems due to possible two-way 
relationships between financial development and investment, the estimation equation 
includes the first lag of the financial development indicator.  For the same reason, the 
equation includes the lags of the growth rate of per capita GDP and trade instead of their 
contemporaneous values.  The estimation equation is the following: 
itititititiit uTRADEgFINII +η+α+α+α+α= −−−− 1,41,31,21,1 lnlnlnln      (1) 
where itI  is the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP, itFIN  is the indicator of 
financial development, itg  is the annual growth rate of real per capita GDP, itTRADE  is 
the ratio of the sum of imports and exports to GDP, iη is a time-invariant country-
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specific intercept that captures omitted fixed effects, and u is the error term.  Five 
indicators of financial intermediation are entered alternatively in the equation: total liquid 
liabilities, credit to the private sector, credit by banks, net domestic credit, each as a 
percentage of GDP, and the share of banks’ assets in total assets of financial 
intermediaries.   
 
 The investment equation is estimated as a fixed-effects model.  The fixed effects 
( iη ) can be eliminated by first-differencing or by mean-differencing the data following 
customary practice in panel data econometrics (Wooldridge 2002; Hsiao 1986; Anderson 
and Hsiao 1982, 1981).  This study uses the latter procedure.  However, after this 
transformation, the mean-differenced error term is no longer uncorrelated with the mean-
differenced lag of the dependent variable and possibly the other mean-differenced 
explanatory variables, which creates a bias in the OLS estimates.  This problem is 
circumvented by using an instrumental variable approach with the two-stage least squares 
procedure, which yields unbiased and consistent least-square dummy variable estimates 
(see Wooldridge 2002; Arellano and Bover 1995; Hsiao 1986; Anderson and Hsiao 1982, 
1981).  
 
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are presented in Table 4.  The results 
show a positive and significant effect of financial development indicators on domestic 
investment.  Since the financial development ratios are entered in logarithm form, the 
coefficients can be interpreted directly as elasticities of gross domestic investment with 
respect to the financial development indicators.  The sensitivity of domestic investment is 
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higher for liquid liabilities and credit to the private sector (with elasticity coefficients of 
0.32 and 0.18, respectively).  The coefficients for credit by banks, net domestic credit, 
and the relative size of banks are not robust to alternative specifications.  In the 
regressions reported in columns 3–5 in Table 4, these three indicators are entered in 
changes (that is, change in the logarithm of the financial development ratio).  When these 
indicators are entered in levels, as it is the case for liquid liabilities and credit to the 
private sector, the coefficients are insignificant (not reported for reason of space). One 
way of interpreting the weakness of the results with these three financial development 
indicators is that, by their definition, these ratios are not good indicators of the supply of 
funds for investment purposes.  Net domestic credit and credit by banks do not 
distinguish between credit to the private sector from credit to the public sector.  In 
developing countries especially, the public sector often accounts for a large share of 
domestic credit demand, a good portion of which is used for government consumption 
rather than public investment.  In such a context, an increase in total domestic credit and 
credit by banks may have little effect on domestic investment.  To measure the effects of 
financial development on investment, ideally one would use disaggregated indicators that 
distinguish between credit for investment purposes and credit allocated to consumption, 
and also between credit to the private sector and credit to the public sector.   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
b. Cross-section regressions 
 In addition to panel data regressions, cross-section regressions are performed to 
test for the long-run relationship between financial development and domestic 
investment.  Each country has one data point consisting of the average of each regression 
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variable over the sample period, except for the growth rate of real per capita GDP, which 
is proxied by the trend growth rate obtained by regressing the logarithm of real per capita 
GDP on time.  The cross-section equation is the following: 
iiiii uTRADEgFINI +γ+γ+γ+γ= lnlnln 3210     (2) 
All the variables are defined as in equation (1).  Applying the instrumental variable 
approach allows us to circumvent the problem of the endogeneity of the indicators of 
financial intermediation, using alternatively the country’s legal origin and the initial value 
of the financial development indicator as instrument for financial development.  The legal 
origin of a country is an exogenous factor which has been demonstrated to be closely 
correlated with factors that affect a country’s financial development (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998, 1997; Levine 1999, 1998). 
 
 The results of cross-section estimation are presented in Table 5.  These results 
indicate a positive and significant effect of financial development indicators on 
investment.  Using the legal origin of the country or initial financial development as 
instrument for financial development yields similar results, except for credit by banks 
where the coefficient is insignificant when the initial value of the bank credit to GDP 
ratio is used as instrument.  When the initial values of financial indicators are used as 
instruments, the coefficients are somewhat smaller in absolute value but their significance 
improves substantially (see p-values), except for credit by banks.   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The coefficients on financial development indicators in the cross-section 
regressions imply a substantial positive long-run elasticity of investment with respect to 
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financial development.  According to these results, if a country’s ratio of liquid liabilities 
to GDP rises by 10%, its domestic investment to GDP ratio would potentially increase by 
up to 2.6%.  The results therefore indicate that the effect of financial development on 
investment is economically significant.  However, this interpretation must be taken with 
caution.  In practice, financial deepening generates an increase in investment only if a 
number of other conditions are satisfied.  In particular, the economy must be capable of 
absorbing the increased financial resources (i.e., there must be effective demand for 
funding) and these resources must effectively be allocated to investment activities.   
 
4.2. Financial structure vs. financial development: which matters? 
a. Effects of the overall level of financial development 
 In this section the investment equation (1) is extended to investigate the effect of 
the overall financial development and financial structure on domestic investment.  The 
analysis consists of testing  whether the overall level of financial development exerts an 
incremental effect on domestic investment in an equation that includes a time-varying 
indicator of financial intermediation.  There are many ways of exploring this effect.  This 
study frames the question as follows: does financial development enhance the response of 
domestic investment to an increase in the demand for output as measured by the growth 
rate of real per capita GDP?  This effect may be called the “accelerator-enhancing” effect 
of financial development.  The accelerator investment theory suggests that an increase in 
the demand for output is accompanied by an increase in the demand for investment 
(Jorgenson 1971).  The ability of investors to meet such an increase in demand for output 
  22 
depends in part on the availability of finance.8  The response of investment to output 
growth will be larger in countries whose financial systems are more efficient in 
mobilizing resources and responding to the financing needs of investors.  This 
accelerator-enhancing effect of financial development is tested by including an 
interaction term between the lag of the growth rate of real per capita GDP and a dummy 
iFD  that equals 1 if a country is classified as financially developed and 0 if it is 
classified as financially underdeveloped.   The estimation equation is the following: 
ititi
tiitititiit
uTRADE
gFDgFINII
+η+β+
β+β+β+β=
−
−−−−
1,5
1,41,31,21,1
ln
*lnlnln
  (3) 
In this test, the financial development indicator (FIN) is liquid liabilities as a percentage 
of GDP.  The other variables are defined as in equation (1).   
 
 The first row in Table 6 (panel a) presents the results of the estimation of equation 
(3) alternatively with and without liquid liabilities.  For expositional convenience, Table 
6 reports only the coefficients on the interaction term between the financial development 
dummy and the lag of the growth rate of real per capita GDP.  The full results are 
reported in Table A4 in the appendix.  The results in columns (I) and (II) in Table 6 are 
obtained using OLS with no fixed effects whereas those in columns (III) and (IV) include 
fixed effects and are obtained using a two-stage least squares instrumental variable 
procedure, which produces least squares dummy-variable estimates (LSDV). 
 
                                                 
8 See Kuh and Meyer (1955) for a discussion of the conditions for the validity of the accelerator investment 
theory. 
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The results in panel (a) indicate that the overall level of financial development 
exerts a positive and significant impact on investment via the accelerator-enhancing 
effect. This effect is robust to the inclusion of country-specific effects and a time-varying 
indicator of financial intermediation (liquid liabilities) in the equation.9   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
b. Effects of financial structure 
 The accelerator-enhancing effect of financial structure is explored by 
investigating the following empirical question: do stock-market-based financial systems 
enhance the response of domestic investment to output growth more than bank-based 
financial systems or vice versa?  This question is examined using an investment equation 
including an interaction term between the lag of output growth and a dummy for the 
structure of the country’s financial system (FSi) as well as a time-varying indicator of 
financial intermediation.  The equation is the following: 
ititi
tiitititiit
uTRADE
gFSgFINII
+++
+++=
−
−−−−
ηθ
θθθθ
1,5
1,41,31,21,1
ln
*lnlnln
  (4) 
The ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP is used as indicator of financial intermediation 
(FIN).  
 
 First the two broad categories of financial systems, bank-based and stock-market-
based are considered, irrespective of the level of financial development.  That is, in each 
category, there are financially developed and financially underdeveloped countries.  The 
financial system dummy iFS  takes the value of 1 if the country’s financial system is 
                                                 
9 Ndikumana (2000) finds a positive accelerator-enhancing effect of financial development in a sample of 
30 sub-Saharan African countries.  This suggests that this result is robust and holds for a variety of 
samples.  
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predominantly stock-market based and 0 if it is bank based.  If stock-market based 
financial systems promote investment (through the accelerator-enhancing effect) more 
than bank-based systems, then the estimate of coefficient 4θ  would be positive and 
significant.  4θ  would be negative if bank-based systems promoted investment more than 
stock market-based systems. 
 
 The coefficients of the interaction term between the lag of GDP growth and the 
dummy for stock-market-based structure ( 4θ  in equation 4) are reported in the second 
row in Table 6 (first row of panel b).  When country-specific effects are not taken into 
account (columns I and II), it appears that financial structure has an impact on investment 
through the accelerator-enhancing effect.  Specifically, a stock-market-based system 
seems to increase the positive effects of output growth on investment.  However, when 
country-specific effects and an indicator of financial intermediation are included in the 
regression, financial structure is no longer relevant (column IV); that is, the coefficient on 
the interaction term between GDP growth and the financial structure dummy (stock-
market based dummy) is still positive but it is no longer statistically significant.  The 
results suggest that whether the financial system is stock-market based or bank based has 
no incremental effect on domestic investment when financial depth and country-specific 
effects are accounted for. 
 
 Within each broad financial structure category (bank based and stock-market 
based), the analysis further distinguishes between financially developed and financially 
underdeveloped countries.  There are four categories: developed stock market based, 
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developed bank based, underdeveloped stock-market based, and underdeveloped bank 
based.  The objective is to test whether financial structure may have different effects on 
investment at various levels of financial development.  First, two separate regressions are 
performed, including an interaction term between the lag of GDP growth and a dummy 
for the stock-market based category in each level of financial development (developed 
stock-marked based and underdeveloped stock-market based dummies).  Second, one 
regression is  performed including dummies for three of the four sub-categories of 
financial structure simultaneously (one of the four dummies must be left out to avoid 
collinearity). 
 
Rows [3] and [4] in Table 6 (in panel b) present the results of the regressions 
including the dummy for the stock-market based category in each level of financial 
development.  The results in row [3] reinforce the findings from the results in row [2].  
Even at a high level of financial development, financial structure has no independent 
effect on domestic investment.  The results in rows [2] and [3] suggest that when the 
level of financial development is controlled for, financial structure has no additional 
effect on investment.  The results indicate that it is the level of financial development, not 
financial structure, which matters for investment.  This conclusion is even stronger at a 
low level of financial development as the results in row [4] show.  When a financial 
system is underdeveloped, even without accounting for fixed effects, whether it is bank 
based or stock-market based has no accelerator-enhancing effect on investment.  
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 In panel (c) of Table 6 (rows 5-7), three of the four dummies for the sub-
categories of financial structure are entered simultaneously in the regression.  The results 
confirm the conclusion that financial structure has no independent effect on investment in 
a model that accounts for the level of financial development and country-specific effects.   
 
To summarize, the results in Tables 5 and 6 show that whereas financial 
development has a positive and robust effect on domestic investment, the structure of the 
financial system plays no incremental role in explaining cross-country variations in 
domestic investment.  This is the most important new result of this study.  This is 
certainly a potentially controversial finding especially in regard to the debate on the 
comparative advantages of bank-based vs. stock-market-based financial systems.  The 
result should not be interpreted as implying that stock-market based and bank-based 
financial systems are identical with respect to their effects on real economic activity.  
This finding should motivate more research to investigate further the links between 
financial structure and real economic activity with the aim of identifying the relevant 
transmission channels, domestic investment being only one of the possible channels. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This study has examined two related but different questions about the links 
between financial intermediation and domestic investment.  The first question is whether 
higher financial development induces higher domestic investment.  The second is 
whether the structure of the financial system (bank based vs. stock-market based) matters 
for domestic investment.  The empirical results are informative with regard to both 
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questions.  The evidence shows that the various indicators of financial development are 
positively related to domestic investment.  This implies that financial development 
facilitates domestic investment to the extent that it is accompanied by an increase in the 
supply of funds to investors.  This suggests that as a country’s financial system becomes 
more sophisticated, capital becomes more available and cheaper, and it is allocated more 
efficiently.  As a result, investors find it easier to obtain the funds necessary to respond to 
an increase in the demand for output, which raises the level of investment. 
 
 The results in this study also indicate that for a given level of financial 
development and controlling for country-specific factors, the structure of the financial 
system has no incremental impact on domestic investment.  The results are inconsistent 
with claims that either bank-based or stock-market-based financial systems are better at 
promoting investment.  The evidence is consistent with the view that banks and stock 
markets are complementary.  This paper contributes to the new empirical literature on the 
effects of financial structure on long-run economic growth (Levine 2001) and industry-
level performance (Beck and Levine 2002).  Whereas these studies focused on long-run 
growth outcomes, this paper examines both short-run and long-run effects of financial 
intermediation on domestic investment.  The evidence in this paper sheds some light on 
the debate on the comparative merits of banks vs. stock markets in stimulating 
investment.  Given the wide diversity in the levels of economic development, investment 
rates, and financial structure across the countries in the sample used in this study, it is not 
likely that the results are driven by some sampling bias.  Moreover, the analysis with 
panel data is a significant improvement compared to the traditional research on the 
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relationship between financial structure and real economic activity, which has typically 
relied on case studies on industrialized countries. 
 
The results in this paper are informative with regard to policies aimed at boosting 
domestic investment.  The evidence suggests that it may not be useful to expend 
resources in trying to promote a particular type of financial structure.  This is particularly 
relevant for less-developed countries that are most resource-constrained.  Instead, 
countries will benefit from reducing policy uncertainty, strengthening the regulatory 
framework, and enforcing creditor and investor rights.  This will create an environment 
that facilitates the development of banks as well as stock markets, which will stimulate 
domestic investment. 
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Table 1: Sample summary statistics (simple averages) 
 
 Gross 
domestic 
investment 
Liquid 
liabilities 
Credit to 
private 
sector 
Credit by 
banks 
Net 
domestic 
credit 
Banks / 
(banks + 
central 
bank) 
assets 
Sample 
mean 
 
22.05 42.50 34.84 48.89 43.14 77.22 
Sample 
median 
 
21.60 34.14 25.39 38.93 34.48 82.91 
Cross-
country 
standard 
deviation 
 
8.46 29.52 29.91 40.56 34.03 20.77 
Within-
country 
standard 
deviation 
5.29 10.47 12.20 18.56 15.85 11.04 
 
Sources: Author’s computation using data from: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 1999; and IMF, International Financial Statistics, December 1999. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics (simple averages) by financial development and financial structure category 
 
 Financial development Financial structure Financial development and financial structure 
 Developed Under-
developed 
Bank-
based 
Stock 
market-
based 
Developed 
bank-
based 
Developed 
stock 
market-
based 
Under-
developed 
bank-
based 
Under-
developed 
stock 
market-
based 
1997 GDP per capita  20615 2480 10906 14971 21045 20148 3153 7207 
GDP growth 1965-1997  2.88 1.21 2.38 2.48 2.75 3.01 2.12 1.57 
Gross domestic  
  investment (% of GDP) 
25.52 20.51 23.24 24.20 25.64 25.38 21.51 22.45 
Liquid liabilities (% of  
  GDP) 
70.99 29.83 52.26 53.48 71.07 68.75 37.41 32.64 
Credit to private sector  
  (% of GDP) 
67.70 21.46 42.86 55.16 64.32 71.84 25.84 29.91 
Banks assets / (banks +  
  central bank assets)  
90.64 71.95 82.11 84.43 89.33 92.32 76.68 73.6 
Net domestic credit (%  
  of GDP) 
70.93 29.73 52.32 55.60 74.13 67.02 34.88 38.31 
Bank credit (% of GDP) 
 
84.52 32.32 59.66 68.11 84.88 84.07 39.65 43.96 
Trade (% of GDP) 
 
74.77 58.48 60.70 66.60 69.37 80.98 67.58 54.5 
 
Sources: Author’s computation using data from: World Bank, World Development Indicators 1999; and IMF, International Financial 
Statistics, December 1999. 
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Table 3. Correlation between domestic investment and financial indicators 
 
Variables Liquid 
liabilities 
Credit to 
private 
sector 
Credit by 
banks 
Net 
domestic 
credit 
Banks assets /  
total assets 
Gross domestic 
investment  
 
0.523 
0.0001 
98 
0.428 
0.0001 
99 
0.355 
0.0003 
99 
0.322 
0.0011 
99 
0.450 
0.0001 
96 
 
Liquid 
liabilities  
 
 0.836 
0.0001 
98 
0.819 
0.0001 
98 
0.781 
0.0001 
98 
0.429 
0.0001 
95 
 
Credit to 
private sector  
 
  0.863 
0.0001 
99 
0.772 
0.0001 
99 
0.543 
0.0001 
96 
 
Credit by banks  
 
   0.948 
0.0001 
99 
0.311 
0.0021 
96 
 
Net domestic 
credit  
    0.250 
0.014 
96 
 
Note: The first number in each cell is the coefficient of correlation, the second is the p-
value, and the third is the number of observations (equal to the number of countries). 
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Table 4: Effects of financial development on domestic investment: Regressions with fixed effects (LSDV) 
 
Explanatory variables [1] With liquid 
liabilities 
[2] With credit to 
private sector 
[3] With credit by 
banks 
[4] With net 
domestic credit 
[5] With commercial 
banks assets share 
 Coefficient 
(p-value) 
1st 
stage 
F-testa 
 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
1st 
stage 
F-test 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
1st 
stage 
F-test 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
1st 
stage 
F-test 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
1st 
stage 
F-test 
Liquid liabilities 
 
0.316 
(0.0005) 
24.2         
Credit to private sector   0.179 
(0.05) 
27.1       
Credit by banks      0.090 
(0.04) 
21.7     
Net domestic credit  
 
      0.099 
(0.05) 
10.8   
Commercial banks assets  
   share  
        0.069 
(0.03) 
4.2 
Lagged investment 
 
0.615 
(0.0001) 
397.6 0.609 
(0.0001) 
359.5 0.367 
(0.0001) 
54.3 0.364 
(0.0001) 
73.5 0.849 
(0.0001) 
70.6 
Output growth 
 
0.0029 
(0.04) 
257.9 0.0032 
(0.02) 
232.3 0.0091 
(0.0001) 
10.9 0.0091 
(0.0001) 
318.2 0.0056 
(0.0001) 
307.6 
Trade 0.306 
(0.0001) 
117.2 0.297 
(0.0008) 
105.3 0.222 
(0.0001) 
32.8 0.229 
(0.0001) 
16.9 0.226 
(0.0001) 
16.6 
Adj. R2 0.363  0.370  0.119  0.117  0.297  
Overidentifying  
  restrictions F-testb 
1.38 
(0.24) 
 1.29 
(0.27) 
 1.81 
(0.12) 
 1.82 
(0.12) 
 1.78 
(0.13) 
 
Observations 2756  2779  2771  2756  2584  
Countries  98  99  99  99  96  
The dependent variable is the logarithm of gross domestic investment as percentage of GDP.  The p-values are given in parenthesis.  The 
explanatory variables are in logarithm (except for output growth) and they are lagged once.  In the regressions [3]-[5], the financial development 
variables are entered in changes; the coefficients on the financial variables are insignificant when they are entered in levels. 
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a   F-test of the (first-stage) regression of lagged regressors (endogenous) on all instruments.  The null hypothesis is that the coefficients on the 
instruments are jointly zero. The p-values are less than 0.0001 in all the regressions. 
b Test for overidentifying restrictions (p-values are in parenthesis).  The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the error 
term; in all the regressions this hypothesis cannot be rejected, supporting the validity of the instruments.  
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Table 5: Effects of financial development on domestic investment: Cross-section regressions 
 
Variables Liquid liabilities Credit to private sector Credit by banks Net domestic credit Bank assets/total assets 
 
 
Instrument 
= Legal 
origin 
Instrument 
= Initial 
value 
Instrument 
= Legal 
origin 
Instrument 
= Initial 
value 
Instrument 
= Legal 
origin 
Instrument 
= Initial 
value 
Instrument 
= Legal 
origin 
Instrument 
= Initial 
value 
Instrument 
= Legal 
origin 
Instrument 
= Initial 
value 
Liquid  
  liabilities 
 
0.262 
(0.062) 
 
0.191 
(0.0008) 
        
Private  
  credit 
  0.155 
(0.082) 
0.148 
(0.0006) 
      
Bank credit     0.184 
(0.081) 
0.064 
(0.268) 
    
Domestic  
  credit 
      0.196 
(0.079) 
0.149 
(0.009) 
  
Banks  
  assets/total  
  assets 
        0.808 
(0.208) 
0.238 
(0.114) 
Output  
  growth 
 
0.052 
(0.019) 
0.061 
(0.0001) 
0.062 
(0.001) 
0.063 
(0.0001) 
0.069 
(0.0001) 
0.080 
(0.0001) 
0.071 
(0.0001) 
0.075 
(0.0001) 
0.036 
(0.437) 
0.075 
(0.0001) 
Trade 
 
 
0.099 
(0.041) 
0.113 
(0.007) 
0.124 
(0.005) 
0.125 
(0.003) 
0.155 
(0.0003) 
0.152 
(0.0005) 
0.142 
(0.0008) 
0.144 
(0.0006) 
0.063 
(0.487) 
0.129 
(0.009) 
Intercept 
 
1.615 
(0.0001) 
1.796 
(0.0001) 
1.931 
(0.0001) 
1.947 
(0.0001) 
1.634 
(0.0001) 
2.059 
(0.0001) 
1.656 
(0.0001) 
1.806 
(0.0001) 
-0.771 
(0.748) 
1.362 
(0.023) 
Adj. R2 0.475 0.496 0.465 0.491 0.455 0.437 0.454 0.468 0.317 0.396 
1st stage F- 
  testa 
10.49 
(0.0001) 
109.97 
(0.0001) 
8.9 
(0.0001) 
83.43 
(0.0001) 
3.62 
(0.005) 
21.43 
(0.0001) 
3.58 
(0.005) 
25.36 
(0.0001) 
7.13 
(0.0001) 
44.63 
(0.0001) 
Observations 98 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 95 95 
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The dependent variable is the logarithm of average gross domestic investment as percentage of GDP.  The p-values are given in parenthesis.   
a   F-test of the (first-stage) regression of the financial development indicator in the column on all instruments (all exogenous variables).  The null 
hypothesis is that the coefficients are jointly zero. The p-values are in parenthesis. 
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Table 6: Effects of financial structure vs. financial development on domestic investment:  Accelerator enhancing effect 
(Coefficient on the GROWTH*STRUCTURE/DEVELOPMENT interaction term) 
 
 No fixed effects (OLS) With fixed effects (LSDV) 
Category Without liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
Without liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
a) Financial development      
[1] Financially developed 
 
0.0057 
(0.002) 
0.0036 
(0.058) 
0.0073 
(0.003) 
0.0089 
(0.003) 
b) Financial structure dummies entered 
separately 
    
[2] Stock-market based 
 
 
0.0033 
(0.017) 
0.0032 
(0.023) 
0.0038 
(0.041) 
0.0018 
(0.442) 
[3] Developed stock-market based 
 
0.0038 
(0.022) 
0.0047 
(0.006) 
0.0013 
(0.303) 
0.0012 
(0.333) 
[4] Underdeveloped stock-market based 
 
0.0024 
(0.306) 
0.0011 
(0.631) 
0.0027 
(0.292) 
0.0013 
(0.596) 
c) All financial structure dummies simultaneously     
[5] Developed bank based 
 
 
[6] Developed stock-market based 
 
 
[7] Underdeveloped stock-market based 
0.0024 
(0.165) 
 
0.0064 
(0.001) 
 
0.0021 
(0.293) 
0.0013 
(0.315) 
 
0.0062 
(0.002) 
 
0.0013 
(0.511) 
0.0029 
(0.196) 
 
0.0077 
(0.013) 
 
0.0038 
(0.108) 
0.0036 
(0.229) 
 
0.0064 
(0.101) 
 
0.0020 
(0.480) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of average gross domestic investment as percentage of GDP.  The p-values are given in parenthesis.  Only 
the coefficients on the interaction between the financial structure/development category dummy and lagged output growth (measuring the 
accelerator-enhancing effect) are reported.  The other regressors included in the equation are the lags of domestic investment, output growth, and 
trade; the regressions in columns (II) and (IV) include lagged liquid liabilities as well.  The full results are reported in Table A4 in the appendix. 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A1: Sample description: classification by legal origin and financial structure 
 
Classification by legal origin 
British law  
(n=34) 
French law  
 (n=56) 
German law 
(n=4) 
 
Scandinavian law 
(n=5) 
Australia 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Botswana 
Canada 
Cyprus 
Fiji 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guyana 
India 
Ireland 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Nepal 
New Zealand 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Papua New  
   Guinea 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Thailand 
Trinidad and  
   Tobago 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Belgium 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Burkina 
Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central  
   African  
   Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
Colombia 
Congo Dem.  
   Rep. 
Congo Dem.  
   Rep. 
Congo Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte  
   d'Ivoire 
Dominican  
   Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
France 
Gabon 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Indonesia 
 
Iran 
Italy 
Jordan 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Netherlands 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Spain 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Austria 
Japan 
Korea 
Switzerland 
Denmark 
Finland 
Iceland 
Norway 
Sweden 
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Table A1 (continued): Sample description 
 
Classification by financial structure 
Developed 
bank based  
(n=15) 
 
Developed stock 
market based (n=12) 
 
Underdeveloped 
bank based  
(n=19) 
Underdeveloped stock 
market based  
(n=8) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Finland 
France 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Jordan 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Panama 
Portugal 
Spain 
Tunisia 
Australia 
Canada 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Greece 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Ireland 
Kenya 
Mauritius 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Venezuela 
Brazil 
Chile 
Denmark 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Peru 
Philippines 
Turkey 
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Table A1 (end): Sample description 
 
Classification by financial development (5 countries not classified) 
Financially developed (n=27) 
 
Financially underdeveloped  
(n=67) 
 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Cyprus 
Finland 
France 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Jordan 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Panama 
Portugal 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African  
   Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
Colombia 
Congo Dem. Rep. 
Congo Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Denmark 
Dominican  
   Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran. 
Ireland 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Syria 
Togo 
Trinidad and  
   Tobago 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Notes: Classification by income level: 33 countries as low income; 25 as lower middle income; 
16 as upper middle income; 4 as high income non-OECD; 21 as high income OECD. 
Classification by region: 31 countries in sub-Saharan Africa; 23 in Latin America; 15 in Western 
Europe; 11 in East Asia; 11 in Middle East and North Africa; 2 in North America; 1 in East 
Europe and Central Asia. 
Sources: Dermirgüç-Kunt, A. and R. Levine, 2001. “Bank-based and market-based financial 
system: Cross-country comparisons.” In: Dermirgüç-Kunt, A. and R. Levine (eds.), Financial 
structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and 
Development.  Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 81-140; Easterly, W. and H. Yu, 2000. Global 
Development Network Growth Database. World Bank. 
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Table A2.  Variables and data sources 
 
Variable name Source Description 
Gross domestic 
investment 
World Development 
Indicators 1999 
(WDI99) 
 
% of GDP 
Real per capita 
GDP 
 
WDI99 Constant 1995 US dollars 
TRADE 
 
WDI99 TRADE = Imports + Exports, % of GDP 
Liquid liabilities WDI99 Liquid liabilities of financial intermediaries = 
M3 as % of GDP 
 
Credit to the 
private sector 
 
WDI99 % of GDP 
Net domestic 
credit 
 
WDI99 % of GDP 
Credit by banks 
 
WDI99 % of GDP 
Banks – Central 
Bank 
International 
Financial Statistics, 
December 1999 
Commercial banks’ assets as % of the sum of 
commercial banks’ assets plus central bank’s 
assets.   
Commercial banks’ assets = line 22 + line 22b 
+ line 22c + line 22d. 
Central bank’s assets = line 12a + line 12b + 
line 12c + line 12d. 
 
Total value 
traded 
 
WDI99 % of GDP 
Indicator of 
financial 
structure 
Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2001). 
Classification of countries as developed bank-
based, developed stock market-based, 
underdeveloped bank-based, underdeveloped 
stock market-based. 
 
Legal origin Easterly and Yu 
(2000) Global 
Development 
Network Growth 
Database 
From sheet: “fixed factors” 
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Table A3: GDP, investment, and financial indicators, average 1965-1997a 
 
Country  GDP 
per 
capita 
1997 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
(% GDP) 
Liquid 
liabilities 
(% 
GDP) 
Credit 
to 
private 
sector 
(%GDP) 
Credit 
by banks 
(%GDP) 
Net 
Domestic 
Credit 
(% 
GDP) 
Banks 
assets 
(% 
total) 
Trade 
(% 
GDP) 
Algeria 1480 33.7 61.8 36.1 62.0 62.0 78.0 52.6 
Argentina 8955 21.5 21 19.1 30.7 27 76.3 14.4 
Australia 20619 24.3 52.7 53.2 67.3 53.8 93.6 33.0 
Austria 30320 26.1 73.9 71.1 90.4 90.4 98.7 67.7 
Bangladesh 338 17.4 20.4 11.8 21.2 21.2 87.0 18.1 
Barbados NA 20.2 51.3 40.6 45.2 42.8 91.8 121.5 
Belgium 28006 20.1 53.7 32.5 72.5 72.5 92.3 116.9 
Benin 387 14.8 19.8 17.0 16.7 16.7 87.7 56.8 
Bolivia 938 15.6 26.5 26.4 33.3 31.4 37.2 48.2 
Botswana 3420 30.8 24.2 13.1 -25.2 -25.2 NA 90.5 
Brazil 4562 21.3 30.2 42.8 59.4 47.3 66.2 16.6 
Burkina  
   Faso 
251 19.2 15.9 11.5 9.5 9.5 89.9 35.6 
Burundi 143 11.4 15.1 9.6 16.9 14.7 54.2 30.7 
Cameroon 631 19.5 18.4 19.5 20.9 20.9 87.7 47.5 
Canada 20208 22.2 62.4 61.1 69.9 50.0 90.5 50.9 
Central  
   African  
   Republic 
346 13.4 17.5 11.5 17.7 17.7 69.5 55.6 
Chad 222 7.4 12.1 9.7 13.6 13.5 77.2 42.2 
Chile 4666 19.9 29.8 38 57.5 57.0 53.9 46.1 
Colombia 2115 19.1 25.3 25.8 31.6 22.5 80.0 29.8 
Congo, 
  Dem Rep. 
127 12.1 12.5 2.4 10.7 10.7 28.3 38.9 
Congo,  
   Rep. 
815 31.1 17.4 16.8 23.1 23.1 79.3 103.1 
Costa Rica 2672 24.2 34.9 21.5 32.8 31.7 68.8 71.5 
Côte  
   d'Ivoire 
789 17.9 27.8 31.1 34.2 34.2 88.6 69.9 
Cyprus NA 29.8 101.2 87.2 101.4 78.3 92.1 106.9 
Denmark 36603 23.7 51.0 45.1 53.4 53.4 84.6 64.7 
Dominican  
   Republic 
1707 21.6 24.2 24.3 34.5 27.1 74.7 59.1 
Ecuador 1584 20.8 24 22.3 26.3 24.3 63.7 48.8 
Egypt 1085 22.6 66.4 25.4 81.2 78.2 60.4 50.7 
El 
   Salvador 
1697 16.1 30.7 27.1 36.2 36.1 70.9 56.4 
Fiji 2434 20.2 39.8 23.1 27.0 27.0 96.9 101.1 
Finland 26895 25.0 48.2 57.7 56.4 56.4 97.3 54.4 
France 27212 22.8 66.1 79.6 92.6 75.9 97.6 39.4 
Gabon 4648 35.6 17.4 16.0 20.0 20.0 89.4 97.4 
Gambia 348 16.2 23.4 15.9 22.5 22.5 81.0 101.9 
Ghana 392 12.1 18.9 5.4 25.0 2.05 34.6 36.5 
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Table A3 (continued): GDP, investment, and financial indicators, average 1965-
1997a 
 
Country  GDP 
per 
capita 
1997 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
(% GDP) 
Liquid 
liabilities 
(% 
GDP) 
Credit 
to 
private 
sector 
(%GDP) 
Credit 
by banks 
(%GDP) 
Net 
Domestic 
Credit 
(% 
GDP) 
Banks 
assets 
(% 
total) 
Trade 
(% 
GDP) 
Greece NA 26.7 54.7 35.4 74.4 53.2 74.9 36.0 
Guatemala 1496 14.7 22.9 14.8 19.5 18.5 76.7 39.8 
Guyana NA 27 64.1 22.6 135.2 129 51.9 141.5 
Haiti 365 12.3 25.4 11.5 28.7 28.2 26.9 37.1 
Honduras 714 21.8 26.5 26.9 33.3 29.1 79.4 66.6 
Iceland NA 23.7 32.3 36.4 40.7 40.7 91.3 70.5 
India 393 21.3 37.3 21.9 41.7 39.9 66.6 15.4 
Indonesia 1141 23.4 23.4 23.5 25.4 25.4 77.7 43.4 
Iran NA 25.3 52.1 31.4 55.9 51.6 53.1 38.5 
Ireland 21063 22 55.0 43.5 54.4 40.4 95.7 101.5 
Israel 15868 24.4 69.5 52.5 96.8 96.8 86.3 87.0 
Italy 19325 23 77.6 59.7 93.0 93.1 87.6 40.4 
Jamaica 1570 26.4 43.9 28.8 42.9 38.0 75.7 95.0 
Japan 42701 32.1 145.9 148.4 199.4 112.3 96.5 21.6 
Jordan 1523 31.5 83.1 49.2 65.9 60.3 83.3 123.3 
Kenya 336 22.2 37.3 25.6 38.4 29.5 81.2 60.3 
Korea 11209 30.1 43.6 49.6 52.6 45.6 90.0 59.1 
Lesotho 515 41.7 37.4 15.0 18.4 19.6 75.9 124.3 
Madagascar 236 10.4 20.3 16.4 25.4 25.4 63.9 38.9 
Malawi 166 20.7 22.5 12.7 24.4 22.1 68.3 60.1 
Malaysia 4720 29.3 76.7 61 76.9 52.2 96.1 113.9 
Mali 266 18.9 19.5 16.8 29.5 29.5 54.7 46 
Malta 9227 27.9 147.6 54.5 61.2 51.7 96.0 165.6 
Mauritania 475 25 19.1 25.5 28.3 28.3 81.3 101.5 
Mauritius 3827 23.5 50.3 27.1 43.9 43.9 84.2 106.2 
Mexico 3412 21.7 26.8 19.8 40.2 25.1 67.3 27.5 
Morocco 1327 21.8 48.5 26.5 52.5 41.6 90.1 50.0 
Nepal 216 15.6 23.3 9.1 18.3 18.3 61.7 30.0 
Netherlands 27196 22.5 75.4 74.3 103.1 79.4 98.9 96.4 
New  
   Zealand 
16835 23.7 52.6 33.7 38.5 38.4 86.1 54.9 
Nicaragua NA 20.5 31.3 30.4 76.5 75.9 65.7 63.4 
Niger 205 11.1 12.5 10.7 11.8 11.8 80.1 41.5 
Nigeria 264 18.4 20.9 10 22.3 22.3 61.3 46.9 
Norway 36319 28.5 53.5 59.5 73.9 54.9 91.7 74.4 
Pakistan 497 16.7 43.3 26.2 49.2 49.2 69.9 31.0 
Panama NA 20.7 38.4 54.2 59.6 58.1 75.1 163.4 
Papua New  
   Guinea 
1089 24.8 32.1 21.1 24.7 24.7 88.2 86.6 
Paraguay 1851 21.8 21.4 18.3 21.1 17.1 67.9 41 
Peru 2663 23.4 20.7 13.9 21.2 18.1 87.4 32.4 
Philippines 1123 23.7 32.9 31.8 42.7 35.8 83.0 52.7 
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Table A3 (end): GDP, investment, and financial indicators, average 1965-1997a 
 
Country  GDP 
per 
capita 
1997 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
(% GDP) 
Liquid 
liabilities 
(% 
GDP) 
Credit 
to 
private 
sector 
(%GDP) 
Credit 
by banks 
(%GDP) 
Net 
Domestic 
Credit 
(% GDP) 
Banks 
assets 
(% 
total) 
Trade 
(% 
GDP) 
Portugal 11295 27.2 89.3 63.8 84.0 84.0 NA 60.6 
Rwanda 209 12.2 14.4 5.3 11.1 11.1 57.2 30.8 
Senegal 569 13.1 22.6 26.3 31.4 31.4 84.4 64.6 
Seychelles 7145 30.0 39.4 13.7 35.5 35.5 84.6 131.8 
Singapore 31600 37.3 90.8 78.9 55.8 46.5 NA 329.6 
South  
   Africa 
3454 23.7 53.7 77.4 98.4 61.3 94.9 51.9 
Spain 15089 24 76.7 72.1 95.2 90.2 71.8 34.6 
Sri Lanka 775 22.6 34.0 17.6 35.2 35.2 60.2 67.4 
Sudan 292 14.4 21.7 8.9 25.8 25.8 54.8 28.9 
Swaziland 1425 26.3 30.9 21.1 10.9 10.9 96.2 149.7 
Sweden 26786 20.3 53.1 82.2 102.8 69.4 89.3 57.8 
Switzerland 44108 26.6 127.2 126.2 139.2 139.2 99 65.5 
Syria 1181 21.3 47.1 8.3 57.6 57.0 45.6 49.8 
Thailand 2915 30.1 51.4 55.8 66.0 52.7 87.1 54.6 
Togo 344 20.5 29.4 19.6 19.6 19.6 82.3 86.6 
Trinidad  
   and  
   Tobago 
4337 22.5 42.2 34.4 32.4 24.2 91.3 82.8 
Tunisia 2203 26.8 44.5 50.3 57.7 51.2 94 69.6 
Turkey 3054 19.2 25.1 18.1 33.4 31.2 70.7 25.4 
United  
   Kingdom 
19867 18.4 NA 57.8 72.2 72.2 86.8 51.0 
United  
   States 
29094 19.0 65.9 84.9 105.1 81.7 89.6 17.3 
Uruguay 6110 16.6 39.1 31.1 45.0 45.0 60.0 37.7 
Venezuela 3549 25.0 37.9 32.2 34.2 22.1 89.7 47.1 
Zambia 408 21.8 28.2 15.9 44.8 42.8 54.5 78.9 
Zimbabwe 689 18.5 35.8 22.9 39.8 27.6 60.6 51.2 
 
Note: NA = not available. 
Sources: Author’s computations using data from: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 1999; IMF, International Financial Statistics, December 1999. 
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Table A4: Full results for Table 6: Effects of financial structure vs. financial 
development 
 
Panel a (corresponding to row [1] in Table 6): Financially developed dummy*growth  
Explanatory variables No fixed effects (OLS) With fixed effects (LSDV) 
 Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
 
Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
FD_DUMMY*growth 0.0057 
(0.002) 
0.0036 
(0.058) 
0.0073 
(0.003) 
0.0089 
(0.003) 
Liquid liabilities  0.032 
(0.0001) 
 0.344 
(0.001) 
Lagged investment 0.828 
(0.0001) 
0.811 
(0.0001) 
0.667 
(0.0001) 
0.543 
(0.0001) 
Output growth 0.0038 
(0.0001) 
0.0041 
(0.0001) 
0.0032 
(0.0004) 
0.0064 
(0.0001) 
Trade 0.0297 
(0.0001) 
0.0237 
(0.0007) 
0.365 
(0.0001) 
0.451 
(0.0001) 
Intercept 0.395 
(0.0001) 
0.357 
(0.0001) 
  
Adj. R2 0.76 0.77 0.45 0.36 
Observations 2925 2860 2918 2845 
Note: FD_DUMMY = 1 if the country is “financially developed” and 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel b (corresponding to row [2] in Table 6): stock-market based dummy*growth 
Explanatory variables No fixed effects (OLS) With fixed effects (LSDV) 
 Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
SMB_DUMMY*growth 0.0033 
(0.017) 
0.0032 
(0.023) 
0.0038 
(0.041) 
0.0018 
(0.442) 
Liquid liabilities  0.0103 
(0.12) 
 0.268 
(0.04) 
Lagged investment 0.0818 
(0.0001) 
0.810 
(0.0001) 
0.668 
(0.0001) 
0.525 
(0.0001) 
Output growth 0.0059 
(0.0001) 
0.006 
(0.0001) 
0.0072 
(0.0001) 
0.012 
(0.0001) 
Trade 0.0161 
(0.001) 
0.0126 
(0.017) 
0.265 
(0.0005) 
0.286 
(0.0005) 
Intercept 0.4889 
(0.0001) 
0.490 
(0.0001) 
  
Adj. R2 0.79 0.79 0.59 0.50 
Observations 1604 1562 1602 1557 
Note: SMB_DUMMY = 1 if the country has a stock-market based system and 0 if it has a 
bank-based system.  
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Panel c (corresponding to row [3] in Table 6): developed stock-market based 
dummy*growth 
Explanatory variables No fixed effects (OLS) With fixed effects (LSDV) 
 Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
DEVMB_DUMMY*growth 0.0038 
(0.022) 
0.0047 
(0.006) 
0.0013 
(0.303) 
0.0012 
(0.333) 
Liquid liabilities  0.027 
(0.009) 
 0.035 
(0.06) 
Lagged investment 0.859 
(0.0001) 
0.836 
(0.0001) 
0.717 
(0.0001) 
0.7222 
(0.0001) 
Output growth 0.0067 
(0.0001) 
0.0069 
(0.0001) 
0.0085 
(0.0001) 
0.0082 
(0.0001) 
Trade 0.0104 
(0.09) 
0.0099 
(0.11) 
0.128 
(0.39) 
0.0039 
(0.87) 
Intercept 0.381 
(0.0001) 
0.344 
(0.0001) 
  
Adj. R2 0.83 0.82 0.59 0.59 
Observations 780 746 780 744 
Note: DEVMB_DUMMY = 1 if the country has a developed stock-market based system 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
Panel d (corresponding to row [4] in Table 6): underdeveloped stock-market based 
dummy*growth 
Explanatory variables No fixed effects (OLS) With fixed effects (LSDV) 
 Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
 
With liquid 
liabilities 
Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
UNDEVMB_DUMMY*growth 0.0024 
(0.306) 
0.0011 
(0.631) 
0.0027 
(0.292) 
0.0013 
(0.596) 
Liquid liabilities  0.0435 
(0.22) 
 0.0277 
(0.13) 
Lagged investment 0.786 
(0.0001) 
0.797 
(0.0001) 
0.796 
(0.0001) 
0.776 
(0.0001) 
Output growth 0.0052 
(0.0004) 
0.0064 
(0.0001) 
0.0055 
(0.0005) 
0.0071 
(0.0001) 
Trade 0.0198 
(0.013) 
0.1175 
(0.004) 
0.136 
(0.0009) 
0.114 
(0.004) 
Intercept 0.574 
(0.0001) 
0.612 
(0.0001) 
  
Adj. R2 0.73 0.73 0.62 0.64 
Observations 823 813 823 813 
Note: UNDEVMB_DUMMY = 1 if the country has an underdeveloped stock-market 
based system and 0 otherwise.  
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Panel e (corresponding to rows [5]-[7] in Table 6): Financial structure 
dummies*growth (entered simultaneously) 
 
Explanatory variables No fixed effects (OLS) With fixed effects (LSDV) 
 Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
Without 
liquid 
liabilities 
With liquid 
liabilities 
DEVBB_DUMMY*growth 0.0024 
(0.165) 
0.0017 
(0.315) 
0.0029 
(0.196) 
0.0036 
(0.229) 
DEVMB_DUMMY*growth 0.0064 
(0.001) 
0.0062 
(0.002) 
0.0077 
(0.01) 
0.0064 
(0.101) 
UNDEVMB_DUMMY*growth 0.0021 
(0.29) 
0.0013 
(0.511) 
0.0038 
(0.108) 
0.0020 
(0.480) 
Liquid liabilities  0.054 
(0.04) 
 0.276 
(0.04) 
Lagged investment 0.814 
(0.0001) 
0.809 
(0.0001) 
0.674 
(0.0001) 
0.528 
(0.0001) 
Output growth 0.0051 
(0.0001) 
0.0058 
(0.0001) 
0.0058 
(0.0001) 
0.010 
(0.0001) 
Trade 0.0014 
(0.004) 
0.013 
(0.001) 
0.252 
(0.0006) 
0.273 
(0.006) 
Intercept 0.509 
(0.0001) 
0.828 
(0.0001) 
  
Adj. R2 0.79  0.59 0.50 
Observations 1604  1602 1557 
 
Note: DEVBB_DUMMY = 1 if the country has a developed bank-market based system and 0 
otherwise; other dummies are defined as in panels (a)-(d). 
In all the panels (a)-(e), the dependent variable is the logarithm of gross domestic investment as 
percentage of GDP.  The p-values are given in parenthesis. 
 
